Friction or Closure:Heritage as Loss by Lundahl, Mikela
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Friction or Closure
Lundahl, Mikela
Published in:
Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research
Publication date:
2014
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Lundahl, M. (2014). Friction or Closure: Heritage as Loss. Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural
Research, 6(2014), 1299-1318.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
 Friction or Closure: Heritage as Loss 
By Mikela Lundahl 
Abstract 
Heritage is a discourse that aims at closure. It fixates the narrative of the past 
through the celebration of specific material (or sometimes immaterial non-) ob-
jects. It organizes temporality and construct events and freezes time. How does 
this unfold in the case of the UNESCO World Heritage site of Stone Town, Zan-
zibar? It is a place of beauty and violence, of trade, slavery and tourism, and the 
World Heritage narrative does not accommodate all its significant historical facts 
and lived memories. In this article I will discuss some of these conflicting or 
competing historical facts. 
The anthropologist Anna Tsing has developed the concept-metaphor friction as 
a way to discuss the energy created when various actors narrate “the same” 
event(s) in different ways, and see the other participants’ accounts as fantasies or 
even fabrications. I will use my position as researcher and my relations to differ-
ent sources: informants, authorities and texts, and discuss how different accounts 
relate to and partly construct each other; and how I, in my own process as an ana-
lyst and listener, negotiate these conflicting stories, what I identify as valid and 
non valid accounts. The case in this article is Stone Town in Zanzibar and the de-
velopment and dissolution going on under the shadow of the UNESCO World 
Heritage flag; a growing tourism; a global and local increase in islamisation; and 
the political tension within the Tanzanian union. My main focus is narratives of 
the identity of Zanzibar since heritagization constructs identity. 
 
Keywords: Identity, Zanzibar, cosmopolitanism, friction, history, heritage, 
memory 
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 It is always the past that remembers (Mudge 2013) 
Tanzania in Our Hearts 
Tanzania is a favourite among African countries by many western governments, 
famous for its relative peaceful and harmonious postcolonial history. It is not by 
accident that when President Barack Obama travelled to Africa in 2013 he includ-
ed Tanzania (the other two visited states were Senegal and South Africa) in the 
tour. Scandinavian countries have strong relations to Tanzania and many Scandi-
navian individuals have personal experience from shorter or longer stays in differ-
ent capacities: as missionaries, aid workers, scholars, volunteers, or just as travel-
lers/tourists (Eriksson Baaz 2005). One reason for the Scandinavian interest is that 
Tanzania was a relatively unimportant colony for its former colonizer, United 
Kingdom, and therefore “open” to neo-colonial engagement from other parties. 
Tanganyika, the mainland part of the union Tanzania, became a British colony 
quite late, after the First World War, when Germany lost all its colonies in the 
Versailles Treaty. Kenya and Uganda were always more important colonies in the 
region for the British Empire, and still are as post-colonies. The independence 
era’s moderate socialist leader Julius Nyerere and his leadership is another reason, 
since he was seen as an excellent example of how Scandinavian social democrats 
imagined the new postcolonial Africa. A Tanzania ruled by African socialism, and 
the principles of Uhuru na Ujamaa (Nyerere 1968), appealed to Scandinavian 
benevolence. These circumstances have shaped my own image of Tanzania, both 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar alike, even if their histories, their identities, their place 
within the Tanzanian union, differ substantially.1 One token of the outstanding 
place Tanzania has in Scandinavia is the fact that both Swedish and Danish aid 
agencies have kept Tanzania as one of their main target countries for third world 
aid in times of austere politics.2  
But there are many reasons why this image needs an update: The image of the 
peaceful and equal country becomes distorted once you look beyond the majority 
of the population. Anthropologists have shown that even if the model of ujamaa 
might have done some good for the vast majority that was either farmers or urban-
ised, it did not suit nomadic minorities at all – especially the smaller and lesser 
well-known groups: the strong focus on farming and land was counterproductive 
and unsupportive of their way of living and making their livelihood (Holmqvist & 
Talle 2005). 
Another conflict regarding majority and minority is the one between the main-
land Tanganyika, and the other part of the union, Zanzibar. Often Tanzania is in 
fact referring rather to mainland Tanganyika and the Zanzibari archipelago is 
more or less forgotten. For example in a recent Swedish thesis on democratisation 
in Tanzania, the author (whose expertise on Tanganyika is indisputable) states in 
the opening that “Tanzania has been independent in 2011 for 50 years.” (Ewald 
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 2011: 7) Tanganyika had been independent 50 years in 2011 but Tanzania did not 
exist in 1961, and its other part, Zanzibar, became independent in December 1963. 
This mistake is very common, and usually not taken very seriously. Even Zanzi-
baris talks about “Tanzania” as something external, referring to “mainland” or 
Tanganyika, not really including themselves in it. The name Tanganyika does not 
have the same status as Zanzibar anymore, the latter still being the main referent 
to Unguja – the name of the main island of the Zanzibari archipelago, as well as to 
the second island, Pemba.3 Tanganyika is the old and official name of the main-
land, which is rarely used nowadays. Naming is, as we know, not innocent; in this 
case these usages of names is complicit in marginalising Zanzibar in relation to 
the “mainland”, in confirming the fiction that Tanzania is more or less identical 
with Tanganyika. 
Zanzibar, the Oriental Pearl of Africa 
When I first arrived in Zanzibar in 2011, I thought I had come to this pearl of 
Tanzania – a part of Africa, but with a mystic touch of the Orient. That is how the 
tourist industry sells Zanzibar to the world, and the narrative consists of a mixture 
of western imageries and projections including pristine beaches and oriental de-
light. And it is of course “true” in one sense. The beaches are long, white and 
fringed by palm trees. Many of the hotels all over the island enact beautifully the 
western idea of the orient, and evoke fantasies about the kind of pleasure that 
scholars (Said 1978; Campbell 2001) have described as essential to western narra-
tives about the orient. The references are subtle, since “[i]magination must take 
the strain when facts are few” and the goal is “to seed fantasies about sex, submis-
sion, jealousy, power and violence” (Campbell 2001: 37) without being too blunt 
about what it is that attracts tourist to the exotic faraway, as well as not disturbing 
the actual oriental part of Zanzibar, the highly religious Muslim community. Both 
urban and rural Zanzibar bears signs of that Muslim community, but in most cases 
reality does not live up to the commercialised orient that attract the tourist gaze 
(Urry 2002). 
But it is Stone Town – Mji Kongwe –, the old part of the capital, Zanzibar 
City, which has attracted the world’s interest and which became a UNESCO 
World Heritage site in 2000. Stone Town is situated on a cape on the east coast, 
facing mainland and the old port of Bagamoyo.4 The town consists of a number of 
outstanding buildings along the waterfront such as the House of Wonder, the Pal-
ace Museum, and the Old Fort etcetera. Beyond these, more anonymous houses 
together constitutes the famous labyrinth inner part of Stone Town, one-family 
townhouses mixed with bigger apartment houses. There are two churches (one 
Catholic and one Anglican), two Hindu temples, and around 50 mosques. The 
estimated habitants are 20.000 but many more spend their days there coming from 
the outskirts, or the surrounding Zanzibar city, home to some 200.000 people. 
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 Most of the buildings in Stone Town are built in the 19th or early 20th century, 
however some are significantly older, at least partially. These houses were usually 
homes to Arabic and Indian tradesmen and their families and employees or slaves. 
In 1832 the sultan of Oman decided to make Stone Town of Zanzibar the capital 
of the sultanate to which Zanzibar belonged already since 1698. In 1890 the Brit-
ish Empire made Zanzibar a protectorate with the sultan as the official leader but 
under the British governor, an arrangement that lasted until Zanzibar became in-
dependent in December 1963. Only a month later a revolution over-threw the Ar-
ab-dominated order that was installed by the Britons as they left governance, and 
in April 1964 the union with Tanganyika was established. During the pre-
independence years Zanzibar was a flourishing cultural and intellectual hub for 
East Africa, which withered away during the 60s and 70s, as more focus and re-
sources in Tanzania were channelled to mainland and Dar es Salaam. Many of the 
intellectuals were either killed during the revolution or exiled in its aftermath. In 
the late 80s and early 90s, the until then the quite sleepy island became a hotspot 
for backpacking tourists and a growing fascination for the historical and decaying 
place begun that eventually led up till the nomination and listing of Zanzibar 
Stone Town on UNESCOs World Heritage list in 2000.  
This is what UNESCO agreed on as Outstanding Universal Values (OUV) in 
Stone Town: 
• Criterion ii: The Stone Town of Zanzibar is an outstanding material mani-
festation of cultural fusion and harmonization. 
• Criterion iii: For many centuries there was intense seaborne trading activi-
ty between Asia and Africa, and this is illustrated in an exceptional man-
ner by the architecture and urban structure of the Stone Town. 
• Criterion vi: Zanzibar has great symbolic importance in the suppression of 
slavery, since it was one of the main slave-trading ports in East Africa and 
also the base from which its opponents such as David Livingstone con-
ducted their campaign.5 
Obviously “history” is everywhere in Stone Town since it is a heritage site. But it 
is not only the aspects of history that is acknowledged in the UNESCO criteria for 
the site, and was considered significant for the World Heritage nomination, but 
other aspects of history, as well as other epochs is present in the town. What inter-
ests me is the relation between the international/global discourse and governance 
and the local effects/affects that became significant in and through conversations. 
Utterances and expressed feelings that I was confronted with in Stone Town dur-
ing fieldwork and interviews is my point of departure. The fieldwork took place 
mostly during two visits, one in November to January 2012–2013, and one in June 
and July 2013, but also during a follow up in July 2014. My informants are mem-
bers of Reclaim women’s heritage – a quite diverse group, but dominating are 
well educated middle aged women who run the centre but there are also some 
newly recruited women who are the “target group”: women who could benefit 
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 from their activities. Other informants are mostly men who live in my neighbour-
hoods and who I know as neighbours, or as workers or managers at, or owners of 
the cafés or restaurants that I frequently visit. Their backgrounds are very diverse, 
some have been abroad for years and has returned to run a business or take posi-
tions in public administration, or they are mainlanders who came to Zanzibar to 
find a work in or close the tourist industry, or they are locals who struggle every-
day to get some small money in relation to tourism, as drivers, boatmen, sellers of 
curiosa etcetera. Their age differ from late teens to middle age. I also talked both 
formally and informally to staff at Stone Town Conservation and Development 
Authority (STCDA). 
History, Heritage, Memory 
The historical events I did expect to encounter and that would matter to Stone 
Towners were related to the above listed criterions: the 19th century, when most of 
Stone Town was constructed as a result of the “cultural fusion” between the Ara-
bic, Indian, Portuguese and African influence. Many significant buildings origi-
nated in this era, and they are what one encounter everyday in Stone Town. This 
structure that emanates from many centuries of “seaborne trading activity between 
Asia and Africa” and that led up to this cultural fusion is also possible to get a 
sense of strolling around in Mji Mkongwe (“old town”). The heydays of slave 
trade have been made visible through a questioned installation named “the slave 
market”.6 But that was not what was on most peoples’ mind once I begun to en-
gage with what most Zanzibaris talk and are passionate about. In the beginning of 
most conversations where I usually told them that I was in Stone Town to investi-
gate what the World Heritage nomination had led to for the inhabitants, the in-
formants politely would answer my questions and serve me brief comments or 
maybe become a bit upset about what it didn’t give them (like no possibilities to 
buy everyday necessities in their neighbourhood because all the former shops had 
been turned to tourist shops run by foreigners, or to develop their properties to 
fulfil their current needs). However, it usually didn’t take long until the conversa-
tion turned to other topics, usually leading to passionate micro lectures about the 
Tanzanian union, which I soon learned was intensively discussed at public spaces 
as the famous Jaw’s Corner where mostly men gather to exchange news and gos-
sip. That topic quickly led to conversations about events some 50 years ago that 
engaged most of my informants – most of them not born or old enough to have 
their own memories – and the present consequences of these events. The historical 
period that keeps coming up in conversations – and also in literature once my gaze 
was turned in that direction – is the era of independence and the unresolved events 
of that period, such as the revolution and the constitution and the conditions of the 
Tanzanian union. In daily conversations on the street, at cafés and tourist shops, as 
well as with professionals in different capacities in the heritage site, topics related 
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 to this turmoil were touched upon, one way or another. This era is not a part of the 
UNESCO documentation and therefore insignificant for the actual heritagization 
of Zanzibar.7 Both the era in itself but also the widespread assumption that some-
thing was lost in that process is absent from the official narrative. What actually 
was lost does not form a coherent narrative, and maybe it is just loss in itself that 
is the main content in these narratives: a shared experience of loss. Much of this 
experienced loss can be related to what in Islands Studies is referred to as “to is-
land”: which among other things refers to the change of identity once the island 
becomes a part of a bigger mainland. Marginalisation and the experience of being 
an extension to this bigger unity rather than to something in itself becomes central 
the new identity built upon islandness. The experience of loss is a part of becom-
ing an island, as a consequence of the decline of oceanic community and the rise 
of continental, and the feeling of marginalisation or difference emerged as one of 
its core traces in how it relates to the world and to its mainland.8  
Friction as a Thicket Path 
My focus in this study was planned to focus on the present and near history: what 
the UNESCO World Heritage nomination had brought to Zanzibar during its little 
more than one decade of existence. However it turned out that it was impossible 
to stay in the present and recent past. Or at least in the sense I was expecting, and 
that the world heritagization directs our gaze towards. As Sharon Macdonald 
writes in Memorylands. Heritage and Identity in Europe today about field meth-
odology: it 
goes beyond simply recording “native voices” but entails a rigorous commitment to 
trying to grasp the patterns of relations of which utterances, practices, feelings and 
so forth, are part; and what they may be linked with. This frequently involves or 
leads to reflexivity about categories of analysis and forms of knowledge production 
– including the role of scholarship itself. (Macdonald 2013: 9) 
I set out asking whether (world) heritagization, with its highly directed and de-
signed version of history, aiming to fit in the UNESCO format, were benefitting 
the people living in the site, or whom it fit/unfit. Does the heritagization silence 
other stories, more relevant and locally important? Who has the power over histo-
riography? This is not only a matter of concern for these people, but also a pre-
requisite to maintain the qualities of the World Heritage site if it shall remain a 
living site and not a museum. My preconceptions of which other stories could 
hide behind the World Heritage narratives were vague. With the anthropologist 
Anna Tsing’s concept of friction, developed to study “the productive friction of 
global connections” (Tsing 2005: 3), I was offered a tool to resist temptations of 
simplified confirmation and closure (White 1979). This is how she came up with 
the concept: 
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 The metaphor of friction suggested itself because of the popularity of stories of a 
new era of global motion in the 1990s. The flow of gods, ideas, money, and people 
would henceforth be pervasive and unimpeded. In this imagined global era, motion 
would proceed entirely without friction. [---] In fact, motion does not proceed this 
way at all. […] These kinds of “friction” inflect motion, offering it different mean-
ings. (Tsing 2005: 5f) 
The notion of, as well as the factual, Tanzania, that mostly includes Zanzibar as 
an exotic appendix, creates friction whenever Zanzibaris interact with non-
zanzibaris, westerners or others. With the help of the concept I could see that the 
preconceptions of Tanzania I brought to this study was not only a problem. Obvi-
ously they obscured my gaze to some degree, but they also turned out to be pro-
ductive and challenging due to the friction that occurred when met with contradic-
tory ideas, and hence challenged. If ideas and conceptions from the field hadn’t 
been put in relation to my preconceptions, I might have ignored them since they 
didn’t fit into my research design. Or I might have accepted them too readily, 
whereas friction pushed me to dwell, to stay in these uncomfortable places, to 
deepen my understandings, and also took me to new places, places that I did not 
plan or expect to go. As Tsing writes: 
Roads are a good image for conceptualizing how friction works: Roads create path-
ways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit where 
we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of confinement. Friction 
inflects historical trajectories, enabling, excluding, and particularizing. (Tsing 2005: 
6) 
As a Scandinavian researcher, with the background I sketched above, the narra-
tives that questioned the legitimacy of the Tanzanian union, appeared provocative 
and disturbing and my immediate impulse was to resist them. I produced all sorts 
of counter narratives to make sense of these statements. Some of the narratives I 
categorised as expressions of a feeling of declassification from (former) privileged 
people, where the context and legitimating framework of the privileged classes 
got lost in the transformation brought by independence, the revolution, and the 
unionisation. Or the loss of a time when class differences were not questioned or 
challenged, when their privileges were not challenged by socialist notions of 
equality and ujamaa (nor integrated in the new postcolonial power structures). 
Others could be understood as statements coming from uninformed poor people 
who are either declassified or who don’t feel that they have benefitted from the 
socialist Tanzanian union and believes they would have been better off in an in-
dependent nation-state of Zanzibar than in the union with Tanganyika. They seem 
to be oblivious of the fact that the wealth and cultural richness that is attributed to 
pre-independence Zanzibar was not equally distributed, and they would most like-
ly have been as poor as they are now with or without the union. These arguments, 
my “explanations”, probably hold some truth. However I acknowledged my re-
sistance and begun to consider its power, and how it was distorting the narratives. 
When I instead looked at the friction they caused, sometimes visible in my replies 
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 (even if I tried to not “talk back”), I could hear and understand these notions dif-
ferently. 
Stone Town as World Heritage. The Tale of a Heritagized Town 
To be listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site is to be identified as something 
extraordinary, and the international community has agreed that the site has out-
standing universal values, which are of relevance for all humanity and shall be 
protected for an indeterminate future (Rao 2010; Frey & Steiner 2011). Obviously 
it is an important event for that locality and for the nation-state, who is the official 
stakeholder, and the nomination will eventually (at least that is what most actors 
aim for) bring status and more visitors, tourists, and money, to the site and to the 
region. More interesting from the perspective of this study, however, is that a 
UNESCO World Heritage nomination has performative powers: the site (or rather 
its agents) has agreed to perform as it self – a self constructed by the nominators 
based on what they saw as possible to transform to a world heritage – in the fu-
ture. A self that has been defined in the nomination procedure by a small group of 
professionals whose most important competence is benchmarking in accordance 
with UNESCO’s values (Ronström 2008). In this particular case that means to 
perform as “an outstanding material manifestation of cultural fusion and harmoni-
zation”. Even if it is the built heritage that this refers to, it still affects the inhabit-
ants who are expected to live and reproduce that very environment. As the anthro-
pologist Rosabelle Boswell writes, with the example from another island in the 
Indian Ocean, Mauritius, which has a UNESCO World Heritage site: 
This obviously required residents of Le Morne (ethnically and socially diverse) to be 
cast as cultural subjects and to Perform a version of Creole identity, as well as to 
draw upon publicly articulated memories to inform their identity. (Boswell 2011a: 
172) 
One question this raises is how to manage culture at a World Heritage site? So far 
what has been done in Stone Town is efforts to preserve the material structure. 
But what about “the cultural fusion”? How do you manage that? Many profes-
sionals argue that it is solely the built environment that is a concern for the nomi-
nation, and that the question about managing culture therefore is of minor interest. 
That might formally be right. But is it possible to separate the two? Can we imag-
ine material structures where actual people live that are conceptually and practi-
cally separated from each other? Is not the latter a prerequisite for the former? 
How can one expect people who live in a site, maybe unaware or uninterested in 
UNESCO policies, to be a part of the preservation of the town? Somehow this 
boils down to if materiality constitutes culture or the other way around, or what is 
more valuable than the other. This is of course a rhetorical question. We know 
that actual people rarely can compete when money, income, “bigger issues”, are at 
stake. But if we forget that, and assume that the cultural fusion that UNESCO has 
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 defined as an OUV is produced and reproduced by the people living it, rather than 
by engineers, architects, managers, etcetera, would not a focus on this lived cul-
tural fusion be a priority, if only as means to preserve the built material? It seems 
as many actors in the field assume that the causality goes the other way around, 
how else can one understand the fact that for example the Swedish Aid Agency 
would engage in heritage preservation at all: the expectation must be that the ef-
fort to preserve the built environment in Stone Town will bring tourists, money 
and development to the region, and therefore minimize poverty. As the anthropol-
ogist Tania Li has shown, there is a strong tendency to focus on materiality, on 
engineers, on some kind of technical support, when it is actually social and cultur-
al support that was the aim for the project from the start. The latter being so much 
more unpredictable, uncontrollable, more difficult: better, as in easier, to put the 
money and time in yet another machine, infrastructure, that is somewhat measure-
able within the given project time – what happens after the project is finished the 
funder is not accountable for (Li 2007). 
There is awareness among the staff at STCDA about the need to work with cul-
ture as well and their lack of competence in that area.9 So far there is not much 
available knowledge on how to work on cultural resilience, and it was not really 
considered when the institution of World Heritage was outlined. Even if it still is 
the built environment that is protected, the maintainers are the inhabitants. 
Stone Town as a Site of “Cultural Fusion” 
There is not one single narrative of the cultural fusion Stone Town is character-
ised by, but many competing and sometimes even conflicting stories, depending 
on who is telling it and for what reason, and in which context and time. There is 
no certainty on exactly when and how different groups of people first came to the 
zanzibarian archipelago – which shares its history with the so-called Swahili 
coast, or the Swahili corridor. In some accounts Zanzibar belongs to the Indian 
Ocean culture, or the Dhow culture – that widespread area where the traditional 
sailing boat named dhow sailed, from the east African coast all the way to the 
Philippines – rather than to continental Africa. In one obvious sense, which we 
soon shall return to, Zanzibar is of course a part of Tanzania and Africa. 
Those who inhabit the islands today are descending from many different 
groups: Africans from the mainland began to come more than 2000 years ago, 
mostly as fishermen, and later they were brought as slaves. During the 800th cen-
tury Asians started to come, the first commonly believed to have come from Per-
sia – and their heritage is referred to as Shiraz, even though there are no available 
hard facts to support that there actually came people from that part of Asia. The 
groups have intermarried and merged during the centuries, and the descendants 
are referred to and identifies as Afro-Shiraz. This group is quite diverse since 
there has been a constant flow between the mainland and the islands and new 
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 waves of Arabic and Indian migrants have been absorbed. Sometimes the Afro-
Shiraz is referred to as Swahilis – as in contrast to people identifying and identi-
fied as Arabs or Indian. Arabs mainly from Oman have frequented and settled the 
islands and the coast for many centuries as traders, and Indians from the Indian 
subcontinent came as workforce and traders mainly during British rule. Since 
Vasco da Gama rounded Cape of Good Hope in 1498, Portuguese, Britons, Ger-
mans and other Europeans, have traded and settled along the coast. 
This hybrid society, in “these coastal and island communities”, is often de-
scribed as “cosmopolitan in flavor” due to its extensive trade relations both with 
the interior of Africa, the Middle East and Asia.10 The “cultural fusion” that the 
UNESCO nomination refers to is often understood as “cosmopolitan” – which is 
an interesting label, given that many scholars consider cosmopolitanism being a 
privileged western state of being (Cheah 2006). The cosmopolitanism that is as-
cribed to Stone Town, in and through UNESCO, can partly be understood as a 
result of the touristic gaze and as a projection. Yet, it can be relevant to describe 
Stone Town as a cosmopolitan place in the sense that a small elite – which of 
course is not unique for this place since cosmopolitanism is most often used to 
describe different elite lifestyles – of varied background has dominated the town 
and its culture during its whole existence. The story of the Zanzibari Princess 
Salme is a good example of that, which might partly explain why it is used in 
many contexts: one exhibition is devoted to her in the Palace Museum in Stone 
Town, and her autobiography, Memoirs of an Arabian Princess, is for sale all over 
Stone Town. Also the House of Wonder has an exhibition space about her, which 
in Boswell’s phrasing “appear to have obliterated the role of Arabs in the persecu-
tion and enslavement of Africans” and she argues that its “[n]ostalgic and roman-
ticized accounts of the Arab descendant princess Salme blur the memory of slav-
ery.” (Boswell 2011a: 173) The story about her is also used as a way to promote 
hotels and give an orientalist air to them.11 But there are other ways to understand 
cosmopolitanism. Stuart Hall described the Caribbean identity in terms of a histo-
ry of uprooting and violent unsettling which has created diverse and mixed socie-
ties, with no grand narratives of the nation-state giving meaning to their existence, 
but still with a of unity, that can be described as “‘becoming’ as well as […] ‘be-
ing’” (Hall 1994: 394). The uprooting in itself, and the forced coexistence with 
strangers in an alien place became another “imagined community” (Anderson 
1991) that Caribbean societies share in spite of other differences. Robbie Shilliam 
develops that idea further when he appropriates the term cosmopolitanism, that 
used to point at privileged peoples lifestyles transcending the nation-state, and 
describes Caribbeans as truly cosmopolitan in how they have come to live togeth-
er and negotiate differences (Shilliam 2011). In his writings about creolity Tomas 
Hylland Eriksen has shown that the concept is not only valid for the West Indies, 
but also for the Indian Ocean, which since many hundred, if not thousands of 
years, has been a very creolised part of the world (Eriksen 2007). 
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 A recurring claim is that the town pre-revolution was divided in ethnic/racial 
enclaves. This narrative is stressed by the Women’s heritage group, both in con-
versations and in their documentation, and the underlying assumption is one of a 
lost imagined harmony, almost in opposition to the idea of “cultural fusion” – or 
maybe the prerequisite for the cultural fusion.12 (2009) A claim contested by Wil-
liam Cunningham Bissell who argues that the idea of the division is oblivious of 
the fact that even if houses were owned and mainly inhabited by Arabs (a quite 
unstable category in itself since ethnic lines did not exactly follow racial) they 
usually had Afro-Shiraz people working and living in their households, or earlier 
on, descendants of African slaves. And there were also poor people of Indian and 
Arab descendent who lived in the poorer parts of the town according to Cunning-
ham Bisell, so the urban geography was more blurred than these nostalgic narra-
tives acknowledge. It is a part of the colonial nostalgia to stress the assumed har-
mony in the colonial society (Bissell 2011: 66f). This “nostalgia” can also be a 
cover for more strategic narratives supported or even created by the British colo-
nial administration that here as elsewhere used ethnic divisions as a means to split 
and govern. According to Sharae Deckard it was a part of British colonial politics 
to project an image of an ethnified town, a projection that had performative pow-
ers: 
The British colonial regime saw Zanzibar in racial categories expressed directly in 
spatial terms. Zanzibaris came to use those categories to their own ends. The decade 
Zanzibaris call the Time of Politics (1954–64) that came at the end of colonialism, in 
particular, was a time of politics orchestrated explicitly around race and racial geog-
raphy in the city. (Myers 2011: 173) 
The influence went in many directions and the ethnic identities were manifold and 
opposing each other in intricate patterns, and “[…] Arab-Islamic dominance was 
not totalizing.” Even if colonial European historians tended to see “direct Arab 
influence in every aspect of the East African urban culture” (Deckard 2010: 100) 
the reality is that they were much more hybridized and diverse. Further, the 
relationship of the Swahili to the people of the coasts and the interior was not one of 
the unmitigated exploitation, but rather a more fluid negotiation of ethnicity and so-
cial positioning. Most Arabs who settled on the coasts gradually adopted Swahili 
culture and speech. A vertiginous array of markers characterized the social hierarchy 
of nineteenth-century Swahili culture, where ethnicity became a vehicle for distin-
guishing between the different groups that composed coastal towns. Established res-
idents, recently settled immigrants, and new arrivals were ranked in terms of how 
indigenous (wenyeji) or how foreign (wageni) the were perceived to be […] The flu-
idity of these ethnic categories, whose boundaries were continually in the process of 
negotiation, sharply contrasts the rigidity of the racial hierarchies constructed by 
Germans and British in their “divide and rule” policies. (Deckard 2010: 100) 
The Zanzibari/Swahili identity has been in constant flux, and political and eco-
nomical changes are important factors in regulating this fluidity.13 Regional power 
structures, growing and declining nation-states, empires, have had great impact. 
The union and the semi-autonomous status of Zanzibar has been questioned since 
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 the birth of the union, and now in 2014, 50 years later, there are serious political 
processes to renegotiate the conditions for the union to grant more independence 
to the two parties of the union. But what is it in all this diversity that UNESCO 
refers to when they use the term “cultural fusion”? As stated above “culture” for 
UNESCO refers rather to the built heritage where different styles and elements 
have merged, in one building or in how houses next to each other “in harmony” 
reflects “cultural differences”, but the relation to the actual people and their cul-
ture that produced this is not really considered.  
Unresolved Memories of a Revolution 
The fact that 1832 Stone Town became the capital of the sultanate of Oman and 
one of the leading towns of the Arab world is still a strong narrative. Even if al-
ready in 1890 that changed, since Zanzibar became a full British protectorate, the 
Sultan kept ruling the country but now under British “supervision”, the infamous 
indirect rule of British colonisation, a construction that remained until independ-
ence 1963. Even if that meant big changes there is a tendency to see continuity 
from at least 1832 (and before) until the union, and to place the big discontinuity 
to the years following independence.14 During British rule racial segregation in 
Zanzibar went from an informal to a more formal condition, and Whites, Indians 
and Arabs in that particular order were favoured. Swahilis with African descent 
were attributed a stronger connection to mainland Africa and were placed at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, under the Afro-Shirazi. The years heading up to inde-
pendence therefore formed a political landscape of 
two camps: the anti-Sultanate, Africa-oriented, and secular Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) 
with a stronghold in the densely populated areas of Unguja; and the pro-Sultanate, 
Arab World-oriented, and explicitly Islamic Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) […] 
At independence, the British handed power to the two parties friendliest to the Sul-
tanate and the status quo: the ZNP and [its ally the] ZPPP.15 
When Zanzibar became independent the 10th December 1963, the British trans-
ferred the power to a party supported by the Sultan. This transfer was provoking 
to the majority of the Afro-Shirazi, who identified it as a strategy to maintain as 
much of the stability and continuity as possible into the post-independent era 
(Burgess 1999). Only one month later, the Sultan was overthrown in a bloody 
revolution led by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), and the People’s Republic of Zan-
zibar was proclaimed. The autonomous republic lasted less than four months, and 
in April 1964 the union of Tanzania, Zanzibar together with Tanganyika, was 
born. These are the events that keep occurring in conversations on the island. 
The Afro-Shirazi Party staged their revolution only one month after the inde-
pendence of December 10th, the 12th of January, as a reaction to the British effort 
to make a smooth transition from protectorate to independence, with the goal to 
maintain good relations to the ruler – who was the same sultan (or his successor) 
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 who had been “leading” the country under British “protection” since 1890, and in 
succession since 1832. The ambition was to secure continuity, and that must be 
understood as a part of the making of the new Eurafrica that European leaders had 
come to realise was the only possible (and desired) way forward, since it had be-
come obvious that colonisation as we knew it had become obsolete (Hansen & 
Jonsson 2014). The 1964 revolution had stirred worries that Zanzibar should be-
come the (revolutionary) Cuba of Eastern Africa, in Europe as well as in the Unit-
ed States. Zanzibar could become that spark that would ignite the radical fire that 
would turn the whole African continent communist. Understood in this way the 
objective with the union was to domesticate the revolutionary Zanzibar and to 
save Africa from the communist flare which was a substantial (real or imagined) 
fear of the 1950s and 1960s, and which would have brought an end to the strong 
bonds between Europe and its former colonies, and therefore undermining the 
intention to keep up the trade between Africa and Europe (Burgess et al. 2009). 
During the revolution, in January 1964, ethnical cleansings, as well as political, 
took place, and many non-blacks, of Arabic and/or Indian descendent, fled or 
were killed (between 5.000–10.000). And again, when the union became a fact, 
many of the revolutionary leaders and intellectuals were also killed, or forced 
away, to exile in Europe and elsewhere. In spite of colonial ideas about the “white 
man’s burden”, it is obvious in this case that the British were more interested in 
securing power than looking out for the poorest in the colony, or in this case, the 
protectorate. Zanzibar was ruled in a classical divide and rule style, and it was the 
Arabs that according to the British had the potential to be leaders. 
The independence and the turbulent years that followed changed the whole ar-
chipelago, but perhaps particularly Stone Town, since it had until then been a 
place dominated by wealthy Arabs, of whom many were killed or forced into ex-
ile. Many of their townhouses were left empty, and little by little they became 
inhabited by Afro-Shirazis coming from the suburbs, the countryside, or by mi-
grating mainlanders. As late as in the 1990s there were still abandoned empty 
houses, before heritagization and tourism boomed. Those transitory years in the 
1960s are a strong heritage and a strong memory, which is retold by Zanzibaris in 
many different versions and contexts, and are used as an explanation to many of 
the experienced changes and shortcomings since then. This is the era referred to 
when experiences of loss are expressed. In the Women’s heritage group there has 
been a focus on collecting childhood stories, and of memories of public spaces.16 
These stories contain nostalgic memories that reflects moments that refers to a lost 
happiness that is told as belonging not only to “childhood” but to a specific child-
hood where the sultan played the role as the patriarch. For example during one of 
the meetings I participated in (January 2013), playgrounds as a public space and 
scene from childhood were discussed, as childhood and public space is one of the 
topics that they have used when collecting memories among women from Stone 
Town. The women talked about memories of swinging and the Sultan is under-
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 stood to have been supplying and maintaining the swings and the playgrounds – in 
contrast to the current republic government – where no swings are available in 
public spaces (Boswell 2011b; Boswell 2011a). In anecdotes like these, seemingly 
without reason, the conversation touches upon the transition from colonial to 
postcolonial times. More often than I would have thought, colonial times are 
privileged, and again my preconceptions are provoked, and my ideas on what 
should and should not be privileged. Postcolonial time ought in my mind be privi-
leged before colonial since it meant independence; republic rule over royal since it 
meant peoples’ rule instead of monarchy. I cannot say that I really can reconsider 
that from a general point of view, but I have to accept the fact that independence 
and the union is not experienced as a success story, and that it has failed in mak-
ing itself meaningful and relevant to many Zanzibaris, and many Zanzibaris that I 
spoke to, expressed a wish that the sultan – who is still alive, in exile in UK – 
should return. 
Another example of this ultra modernity in nostalgic dress, relates to the (lack 
of) infrastructure in the town. Stone Town was once considered among the most 
modern African cities, the installation of the first elevator in the House of Won-
der, being one often referred to example. Typically however, the elevator has not 
been in use in decades. The streets of Stone Town had electric lighting before the 
streets of London. Another more crucial thing is water distribution: there are a 
number of big water distributors in Stone Town, that every household – if they do 
no not have a private well on their property or common backyard – has to connect 
to, with their own pipes to the street. This creates a chaotic system of pipes 
(mixed with electric lines) some three meters above the ground all over Stone 
Town. That is neither practical, nor aesthetically in accordance with what one 
would expect from a World Heritage site, where the regulations on how one can 
repair or rebuild one’s house is quite detailed and restricted. But there was a func-
tional water distribution system “before independence”, before the assumed mis-
management of the town, that is described as beginning with the revolu-
tion/unionisation and lasting at least until the heritagization process begun in the 
early 1990s. This fact, that there used to be a more developed water system is in-
tegrated in the narratives of loss, and is also typical in the process of islanding. 
Islands tend to create narratives of a glorious prehistory before the integration 
into/with the nearest mainland. 
Those examples show that the pro-independence years are idealized, and since 
it is also the time of the sultanate, with its stronger political, cultural and econom-
ic bonds to the Arabic peninsula than to the “mainland”, these narratives contrib-
ute to the on-going orientalisation of Zanzibar. The independence and the revolu-
tionary years serve as point of nostalgia, both for those generations who remem-
ber life in town during the sultanate, and for those who experience the revolution 
as loss (Bissell 2005; Lowenthal 2013). This loss also entailed loosing a radical 
well-educated elite, with influences from all over the Indian Ocean Area and East 
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 Africa, and Zanzibar as the intellectual, political, and cultural metropolis of East-
ern Africa (Burgess et al. 2009). 
Shifting Frontiers 
There are many contradictions in the political landscape and its uses of identity 
and belonging, since nowadays it is the “mainland” in itself, as well as the “main-
landers” presence on the island, that is questioned, and work as an agent in the 
reinvention of Zanzibari identity. During the time of revolution and the fight for 
independence the antagonisms between Africans and Arabs grew strong as citi-
zenship during the years before full independence was a crucial question, and be-
came quite politicised. As Thomas Burgess argues there was an interest among 
many of the Arabs, whom mostly belonged to the Zanzibar Nationalist Party 
(ZNP) to consider their marginal position in terms of numbers. They argued that 
more “recent African migrants from the mainland” should be excluded from the 
electoral rolls, whereas the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) wanted to include “main-
landers”. Both positions must be related to the fact that “only 17 percent of the 
total population identifying themselves as ‘Arabs’ in the 1948 census”, and that 
the question on how to construct the zanzibarian identity was a hugely political 
one (Burgess 1999: 32). ASP on their part meant that ZNP was put into power 
maintain Arabic economic and political domination, which could be traced back 
to the enslavement of Africans in the 19th century. The ZNP argued that they were 
“the only genuinely anti-colonial, multi-racial, Muslim party”. What was at stake 
according to Burgess (1999: 32) was the “the very identity of Zanzibar”. ASP 
claimed the ties to Africa and the continent, whereas ZNP imagined Zanzibar’s 
future as a “multiracial Muslim state with its strongest cultural and political ties 
with the Arab Middle East” (Burgess 1999: 32). Translated to the current political 
landscape the distancing from the mainland has become naturalised, and seem to 
be shared by most Zanzibaris, and to claim Zanzibari identity as a non-mainland, 
and even non-African identity, has become mainstream. This opposing identity is 
explained in cultural as well as in historical terms. As one of my informants stated 
while discussing the eventuality of a future separation between Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar: 
We were always mixed, and we are therefore more developed. […] We overthrew 
the Britons ourselves, we took our freedom, but on the mainland it was given to 
them. 
The statement was uttered as a part of a discussion about the difference between 
the Zanzibaris and the mainlanders. In it he, a man from Stone Town, in his thir-
ties, who spent almost a decade in Europe, is expressing a similar idea of what is 
typical for Zanzibar as the one formulated in UNESCOs criteria about the cultural 
fusion, and he attributes to it a worldliness, an understanding of how to deal with 
the complexities of the modern and globalised world. Further he implies that Zan-
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 zibaris has agency (enough to overthrow their oppressors), and knowledge, and 
contrasts that to mainlanders who are assumed to be backwards, simpleminded, 
and passive victims, of history and globalisation, due to their lack of long-term 
interaction with many different modes of thoughts and lifestyles. But the state-
ment also shows discrepancy with historical facts: the independence was “given” 
equally to both the countries, and a couple of years earlier to Tanganyika than to 
Zanzibar. Nonetheless it is a revealing utterance of how Zanzibaris/Stone Town 
inhabitants use history and the past to tell a story about cosmopolitan heritage. 
Questions surrounding who the Zanzibaris are and where they came from are deeply 
problematic. Although the questions originate in a very distant past, it is a past 
dredged up daily in Zanzibar, articulated with the rise of mass tourism as the main-
stay of the city’s, and the island’s, economy, and the consequent commodification of 
history. It is a past reconstructed regularly across the diaspora as well, across many 
forms of media and in everyday conversations. (Myers 2011: 172) 
Identity and the question of whom is Zanzibari and who is not, is on the table eve-
ryday. Yet there seems to be an agreement that a “real” Zanzibari can come in 
many colours, ranging from very dark to almost white, and can belong to different 
ethnicities: Afro-Shirazi, Swahili, Indian, or Arabic, as well as of mixes of these. 
That said, one should not be tempted to believe that there are no frictions to the 
coexistence of these different identities. But they are all accepted as Zanzibari in 
contrast to mainlanders or expats. As Myers frames it, Zanzibar is “a fractured 
homeland and a fractured diaspora.” (2011: 173) And Zanzibar  
is particularly politicized in its complications. There is a Zanzibar that belongs to the 
United Republic of Tanzania, and a Zanzibar that belongs to history as many differ-
ent things. […] Zanzibar is claimed by pan-Africanists and African nationalists and 
communist revolutionaries and Arab nationalists and Islamists and Pempanists and 
human rights activists and hip-hop artist. […] What unites Zanzibar, what is held in 
common as Zanzibar, or who belongs to what Zanzibar, and who gets to decide 
which Zanzibar is which? (Myers 2011: 173f) 
The UNESCO statement “The Stone Town of Zanzibar is an outstanding material 
manifestation of cultural fusion and harmonization” might be true when it comes 
to “cultural fusion”, but the “harmonization” is not obvious from all corners – if 
we are not restricting our conversation only to how “Indian” balconies are harmo-
niously attached to “Arabic” houses.  
Identity is a burning issue almost everywhere, which takes different forms and 
is used to different ends. The last couple of decades “identity politics” have been 
widely questioned by many scholars. Yet, identity matters for people, politics, 
culture, life, and resistance. In most societies politics is mediated through identi-
ties, and it is often through identity one is interpellated and affected by social or 
religious movements, political parties etcetera. From the case of Stone Town, and 
its “cultural fusion” it is obvious that “ethnic identities […] represent only ‘a 
small fraction’ of the many identities mobilized in postcolonial Africa” and that 
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 time, and political, social change plays in to how identities develop, or are devel-
oped (Myers 2011: 30). 
In Zanzibar the concept of indigeneity is not often used, but when it is, it refers 
to the Afro-Shirazi, who are understood to have been first on the islands, and that 
is in the political context of the ASP – Afro-Shirazi Party. It seems as if different 
ideas of mixed or parallel identities is more fitting to understand and describe how 
Zanzibaris understand identity: creolity, hybridity (Bhabha 1994; Hall 1994; 
Eriksen 1995). But it might be that ideas of cosmopolitanism is a better way to 
describe the way people live “side by side” – as Homi Bhabha formulated it re-
cently, also asking for new ways to think urbanity as a cosmopolitanism that is 
based not in elites, but in all migrants over the world: 
What does it mean to be at home in globalization? What forms of solidarity and alli-
ance are made possible by living side by side with difference and alterity? Must we 
live in the shadow of sovereignty, or can we surpass it, or are we caught in its am-
bivalence? (Bhabha 2013) 
Also Robbie Shilliam suggest that we redefine the concept of cosmopolitanism 
and bring it out of its Eurocentric worldview that makes us understand it as an 
impulse emerging from the west, when it can be argued that cosmopolitanism has 
been growing in many hybridized, creolised societies, far from the western me-
tropolis (Shilliam 2011). This shall not be understood as if cosmopolitanism is the 
norm elsewhere, but a possible future that is not necessarily Eurocentric. As Bur-
gess argues “Zanzibari revolution […] was a violent rejection of Zanzibar’s cos-
mopolitan heritage” (Burgess et al. 2009: 1) and that it broke with 150 years of 
Arabic and south Indian economical and cultural hegemony and aimed at bringing 
Zanzibar “back” to a more monocultural “African” community. Many hoped for 
the revolution to heal the wounds and tensions caused by the slave trade and colo-
nisation, which it didn’t. Instead it can be argued that it overshadowed it, and cre-
ated new tensions and fractures, and the union that followed became another ex-
ample of how the problems with identity politics, can not be solved either through 
the installation of a new identity – African instead of Arabic – or by unifying ide-
as as that of the Tanzanian unions: ujamaa, if the inherent conflicts are not dealt 
with, and given its proper space in the collective memory. But the Swahili identity 
shows its resilience, and its capacity to, as all creolised cultures, survive in new 
circumstances, as itself, but different. 
Epilogue 
As I do the final editing on this article I am back in Zanzibar, and Stone Town is, 
in July 2014, getting closer to be put on the list of danger, due mainly to two in-
terventions, one that has been a concern since I came here for the first time in 
2011, and one new: the first being the big new hotel at the seafront on a former 
public space. The second threat is the planning of a new or extended harbour that 
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 will eat into the northern part of the seafront (as well as of the mangrove forest 
north of town). Is that something spoken of? Not really. When I try to ask about it, 
people are unaware of the significance and when I explain they agree that it is not 
a good thing… but still, development is more important. The on-going discussions 
about changing the constitution for the union stirs up much stronger sentiments, 
than any threat against the World Heritage status. To not getting more autonomy 
in the union is considered a definite threat. 
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1  I want to thank Dr Anna Bohlin at School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, and 
the seminar at Centre for Africa Studies, University of Cape Town, for reading and comment-
ing on an earlier version of this article. 
2  Tanzania is the Swedish Aid Agency’s (SIDA) biggest receiving country with ca. 800 million 
SEK, http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Har-arbetar-vi/Afrika/Tanzania/Samarbetet-i-siffror/ (re-
trieved 24 July 2014), almost the same amount, 640 DKK, is Denmark’s development coop-
eration (DANIDA) contribution to Tanzania: http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-
vi/aarsberetning2012/danmarks-udviklingssamarbejde-i-tal/danmarks-bilaterale-bistand-til-
afrika-2012/ (retrieved 24 July 2014). 
3  When I in this article refer to Zanzibar it is Unguja that is implied. 
4  Bagamoyo used to be the capital but when the harbour of Dar es Salaam grew Bagamoyo 
declined, but now Chinese investors is building a new harbour. In the old days it used to ship 
out slaves and ivory, whereas the future gods will be crops, petrol, gas and minerals. 
5  http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/173 (retrieved 24 July 2014). 
6  Many locals and scholars dismiss this as an authentic slave market, and the caves that are 
narrated by guides as spaces to accommodate slaves, probably contained food and other sup-
plies, rather than people. The actual slave market was held in the open, close to the waterfront 
in the area of Shangani. 
7  World heritage is as much a national business as it is international. The original intention was 
to protect objects that were of universal interest, but it has become a way to promote national 
status and it is the nation-state that nominates and who is responsible for the world heritage 
sites. In this case it is important that the nation-state is not Zanzibar but Tanzania, and that 
there is no public interest to highlight the memories that people are most occupied with. I 
cannot go further into this political aspect of the heritagization of Zanzibar here but I think it 
is relevant for anyone who wants to understand the heritagization, that there are many layers 
in every site and what is possible or desirable to heritage might not be what actually matters 
to people. One must also take into account that (intangible) memories are often considered as 
of lesser political as well as scholarly value than (tangible) heritage. 
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Notes 
 
 8  In the first issue of Island Studies Journal it is stated that “Islands are platforms for the emer-
gence of national identity and for the affirmation of cultural specificity: critical resources, es-
pecially in a context of sweeping globalization and the death of cultures and languages. As 
prototypical ethno-scapes, islands have spearheaded the study of the production of locality”. 
Baldacchino, Godfrey (2006): “Islands, Island Studies, Island Studies Journal”, Island Studies 
Journal, 1, 3–18. 
9  In interviews with two engineers employed at STCDA that was conducted in July 2013.  
10  http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/tanzania/history (retrieved 24 July 2014). 
11  One example is how the story of the 19th century Omani Princess Salme is exploited, in the 
advertisement by one boutique hotel: http://www.thezhotel.com/on-the-footsteps-of-princess-
salme-of-zanzibar/ (retrieved 24 July 2014). Recently also the famous Emerson on Hurumzi 
exhibit a Princess Salme show. 
12  Reclaim women’s heritage space is an NGO founded in cooperation with former Swedish 
Gender Studies of the university college of Gotland, and earlier funded by SIDA but nowa-
days on their own, trying to survive both as a supporting group for women’s business, and as 
a stakeholder of the world heritage. http://reclaimzanzibar.blogspot.com/  
13  Compare the discussion Jean-Loup Amselle has in Mestizo Logics, where he claims that peo-
ple in West Africa before colonisation tended to use the “tribal” belongings quite fluidly, de-
pending on which belonging was most beneficial at a certain time and place. Amselle, Jean-
Loup (1998): Mestizo logics: anthropology of identity in Africa and elsewhere, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.  
14  Erik Gilbert makes an argument in the same line, in his investigation of the colonial econo-
my: “If there was a fundamental continuity between Zanzibar of 1860 and the Zanzibar of 
1960, Zanzibar in 1970 was a totally different place” Gilbert, Erik (2004): Dhows & the 
colonial economy in Zanzibar, 1860–1970, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.  
15  http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/tanzania/history (retrieved 24 July 2014). 
16  See Reclaim (2009): Reclaim Journal. (Re)claim Women’s Space in World Heritage 2004–
2009. Genderinstitut Gotland, Reclaim Women’s Space in World Heritage Association, p 65–
86. But it was also something they told me about at one of their Saturday meetings that I at-
tended, and they showed me some samples of drawings that were produced during these 
memory workshops. 
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